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Abstract
We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are pri-
vately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in explo-
ration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to ineﬃciently herd into explo-
ration in an attempt to boost their market value. The theory is consistent with both
high-delegation practices and practices where agents are assigned to activities. Our
main result is that an agent should be delegated more the weaker career concerns,
a variable that is made endogenous through the firm’s technology and its degree of
transparency. The theory sheds light on empirical regularities that are previously
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1 Introduction
Who should decide which tasks or projects an employee engages in? The bureaucratic
approach to job design is to first define the activities contained in the job slots and
then to hire suitable employees to fill those slots, giving the employees limited leeway.
The bureaucratic approach is thoroughly investigated in the principal-agent literature,
which emphasizes centralized decision-making (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991, and Baker,
1992). An ample empirical literature (Osterman, 1994, Ichniowski et al., 1996, Baron
& Kreps, 1999, Caroli et al., 2001, OECD 1999, and Rajan & Wulf, 2003) emphasizes
decentralization of decision-making authority and autonomy, or delegated solutions to the
job design problem. Two extreme but illustrating examples are the US companies Sun
Hydraulics, where agents have “the right and responsibility to choose how they spend
agents time” (Kaftan, 1984/1991) and Gore & Ass., producer of Gore-Tex c° products,
which encourages “maximum freedom for each employee” (Gore, 1990).
The purpose of the paper is to suggest a theory that addresses the question of why
delegation occurs and what poses limits to delegation. The theory is based on the following
trade-oﬀ: The upside to delegating more is that it enables the employee to use his private
information when allocating eﬀort between activities. For example, a worker may know
better than his superiors whether he should be engaged in more routine tasks such as
product updating or testing, or in more challenging tasks such as product innovation and
design. Or a manager may know better than his superiors whether he has the skills to
lead a new and bold research and development project.
The downside to delegating more is that the agent may use the freedom to reap private
benefits through enhancing his market value. For example, if the most able agents in a hi-
tech firm are engaged in product development, then less able agents engaging in product
development may have better future prospects than if engaged in product updating, if the
market views job description as an indicator of ability. Or if more able managers tend to
initiate bolder projects, then less able managers may be tempted to act similarly.
How much should firms delegate given these two opposing eﬀects? To address this
question, we build upon a variation of the Roy (1951) model. Agents are of two possible
types, privately known to them. In each firm there are two activities, the easy/exploitation
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activity and the diﬃcult/exploration activity. An eﬃcient allocation implies that low
agents exploit and the high ability agents explore. By job design we mean the decision
about which activity an agent should engage in (the activities are mutually exclusive).
When career concerns are weak (its determinants are discussed later) firms fully del-
egate the job design decision to the agent, and structure a compensation scheme so that
agents do so eﬃciently. Such a scheme involves paying the low type a premium, i.e.,
pay above marginal productivity, to self-sort into the easy activity, since working in that
activity will be a bad signal about ability. When career concerns are strong, however, full
delegation would require a self-sorting premium so large that outside firms could cream-
skim the high type agent, and a high degree of delegation would be unprofitable. Under
strong career concerns, the principal assigns the agent to an activity, even if this entails
that the agent’s local knowledge is left unused. The principal assigns more the stronger
career concerns, and more assignment implies a less eﬃcient allocation of talent inside
the firm. Therefore more delegation is associated with higher average wages. This agrees
with recent empirical literature (Caroli & Van Reenen, 2001, Black et al., 2003, and Bauer
& Brender, 2003) and contrasts with other theoretical literature such as Aghion & Tirole
(1997).
We find that assignment will take the form of placing the agent in the diﬃcult activity.
The economic intuition for this is quite simple. The principal uses the degree of delegation
as a tool in recruiting able agents. By restricting the agent to do the diﬃcult activity, the
firm avoids being stuck with low talent. Hence we obtain a theory that explains limits to
delegation, but also how firms can use job design to attract talent.
The job design literature, Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), Prendergast (1999), and
Olsen & Torsvik (2000), among others, asks which combination of tasks should be in-
cluded in the description of a job. Instead we focus on who should decide, the agent or
the principal. Similarly, the job assignment literature, including Rosen (1982), Gibbons
& Waldman (1999a) and Ortega (2001) considers settings with symmetric information
between superiors and subordinates, a circumstance under which there would be no ad-
vantage of delegating. The same point applies to the literature on career concerns, as
in Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982/1999). In the literature on adverse selection in
labor markets (for example, Greenwald, 1986, Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996, and Acemoglu
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& Pischke 1998) workers have private information prior to hiring, but ability is assumed
to be revealed to the firm once the worker is hired. In contrast, firms in our setting face
adverse selection both at the hiring stage and when allocating workers inside the firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3 contains
the simplified analysis without performance contracts. Section 4 contains a discussion of
applications and modeling assumptions, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains
the analysis with optimal performance contracts.
2 The model
There is one industry with two active firms in each of two periods and one agent. Firms
and the agent are risk neutral and there is no discounting. The agent has two possible
types, t ∈ T = {L,H}. The agent knows his type while firms have the prior θ that
the agent is H. In each (identical) firm there are two activities; the “easy” (E) and the
“diﬃcult” (D).1 The two activities can be interpreted as diﬀerent projects (like diﬀerent
R&D projects), diﬀerent tasks (like product updating versus product development), or
diﬀerent methods in performing a certain task (like diﬀerent types of analysis). Both
types have productivity π0 in the E activity. In the D activity, the low type has expected
productivity πL, and the high type has expected productivity πH , where πL < π0 <
πH . We think of the E activity as having lower complexity and being more prone to
standardization than the D activity. By job design we mean the decision about which
activity the agent should specialize in.
Firms have a one-period lifespan and write one-period contracts.2 The observed pro-
ductivity of the agent in period i equals πi. Contracts in each period specify a wage w
and the degree of delegation d as a function of the observables, i.e., the history of the
1A quotation from March (1991, p. 71) illustrates well the distinction we have in mind: ”Exploration
includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility,
discovery, innovation. Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, eﬃciency,
selection, implementation, execution.”
2Whether the first-period firms and the second-period firms are identical or not is immaterial for the
analysis (as long as information among firms is symmetric and contracts are still one-period in length).
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agent, his current-period performance πi and his current-period activity.3 The degree of
delegation d is the key endogenous variable as to who makes the decision about what
project the agent engages in, the principal or the agent (d is probability that the agent
will decide).
In the basic analysis of Section 3, firms can not condition wages on the agent’s output
(think of this as a scenario where output measures are very noisy). This will highlight the
role of delegation and activity choice in determining wages. First-period contracts must
then be a wage wD1 for the D activity, a wage wE1 for the E activity, both non-negative, and
the degree of delegation d ∈ [0, 1]. Since there is no incentives for misrepresentation in
the second period, we assume for convenience that the agent chooses his eﬃcient activity
in the second period, so that a contract oﬀer is simply a wage w2(I), where I is the
information generated in the first period. In the Appendix, we solve a general model
where pay can be conditioned upon performance.
The timing goes as follows. In the beginning of the first period, the firms simultane-
ously oﬀer contracts {wD1 , wE1 , d}, and nature then chooses the type of the agent. The
agent then learns his type. Having observed the contract oﬀers and his type, the agent
accepts to work for one of the firms. That firm is then free to improve its oﬀer to its
workers by proposing {w’D1 , w’E1 ,d’}, where {w’D1 ,w’E1 ,d’} ≥ {wD1 , wE1 , d}. This improved
oﬀer is valid only for the workers who accepted the original oﬀer (workers can’t switch
firms at this stage). It is then determined whether the agent is delegated the decision of
which activity to undertake or not (delegation occurs with probability d). The agent is
then allocated to or chooses an activity, according to the outcome, and the wage is paid.
The first period ends with all actions in the first period becoming public knowledge (the
agent may still know his type privately). In the beginning of the second stage, the firms
simultaneously oﬀer the agent a contract conditional upon their mutual information.
A strategy for the first-period firms is a vector of initial oﬀers {wD1 , wE1 , d} and
interim oﬀers {w’D1 , w’E1 , d’}, and a strategy for the second-period firms is a wage w2(I).
A strategy for the agent is a mapping from T and the contract oﬀers to a choice of which
contract to accept in the first period, a mapping from T and the renegotiated oﬀer to
3We assume that a message game is too costly to implement. This assumption can be justified by
intrinsic cost of communication (Dessein, 2002), or because the principal lacks commitment power.
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which activity to choose (if given the choice), and a mapping from T and wage oﬀers in
the second period to a choice of which oﬀer to accept. The agent maximizes his lifetime
income. If the agent is indiﬀerent between which firm to work for, we assume that he flips
a fair coin to make a decision. We focus on Sequential Equilibria (SE).4 That a strategy
tuple is a SE means that: (i) the agent chooses a firm and activity optimally in each
period, (ii) the firms anticipate the agent’s behavior and chooses wage oﬀers to maximize
profits, (iii) the firm’s posterior beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule whenever possible,
and (iv) the equilibrium is a limit of one where beliefs are restricted to be interior. In
terms of equilibrium selection, we focus on first-period initial wage oﬀers that are “time-
consistent” in that firms do not wish revise them in the interim. Informally speaking, by
focusing on time consistent oﬀers we exclude “bluﬀ” oﬀers.
Some comments to the setup. (i) The firms’ option to raise any of the wages after
the agent has accepted the contract is a natural requirement, since it allows for the firm
and the agent to find a better contract once the agent has started in the firm. To focus
on equilibria that are immune to such renegotiations (time-consistent) is fairly standard
in the contracting literature (e.g., Krasa & Villamil, 2000). (ii) One may ask how the
firm can commit to play essentially a mixed strategy in the interim (the decision as to
whether delegation occurs). The most reasonable interpretation is that the firm hires
several agents, so that we can interpret d as the fraction of agents that get the freedom
to choose. (iii) The spirit of wage setting in the model is similar to compensating wage
diﬀerentials (Rosen, 1986, and Stern, 2004), except that we have such diﬀerentials inside
the firm rather than in the market. (iv) We have assumed that information about the
agent is symmetric between the firms. Waldman (1983) and several later papers consider
the possibility of asymmetric learning, where the inside firm learns more than the outside
firm about the agent before the second period. The asymmetric learning case of our
model was considered in the working paper version of the paper, and some of the results
are referred to later.
4Employing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium would yield identical results.
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3 Analysis
First we focus on full-delegation, separating equilibria, where d = 1 and both types self-
sort to their eﬃcient activity in period 1. Then we analyze assignment equilibria, where
d < 1 and the agent (with probability 1 − d) is assigned to an activity. To break ties,
we assume for convenience that the agent has lexicographic preferences over wages and
activity: if the wage oﬀers are such that he is monetary indiﬀerent between the E activity
and the D activity (taking into account the implicit incentives) then he prefers the eﬃcient
activity.5
3.1 Separating equilibrium
Proposition 1 If πH − π0 < π0 − πL then the unique time-consistent SE is a separating
equilibrium with d = 1.
Proof. In the conjectured equilibrium, first-period firms oﬀer {wE1 , wD1 , d = 1} in the
beginning of the first stage, the agent chooses a firm randomly after learning his type, the
firms do not adjust wages in the interim, and the agent chooses his eﬃcient activity. In
the second period, firms oﬀer wD2 (wE2 ) to if the agent was engaged in the D (E) activity
in the first period. In the interim, the firm believes that the agent is H with probability
θ if he accepted the oﬀer. The second-period firms believe that the agent is H (L) with
probability 1 if he was engaged in activity D (E) in the first period.
We first derive wages in the conjectured separating equilibrium, denoted by {wE1 , wD1 ,
wE2 , wD2 }, then prove existence, and finally uniqueness. For simplicity of exposition, we
set θ = 1/2 (the full expressions appear in the Appendix). If the agent is engaged in
his eﬃcient activity in the first period, his type is revealed before the second period.
By Bertrand competition between second-period firms, he must be paid his marginal
5This tie-breaking rule is used quite extensively in the current section, where both types will be
monetary indiﬀerent between the wage contracts oﬀered. This property of the equilibria constructed
disappears with optimal performance contracts, as shown in the appendix. So the right interpretation
of the model in the current section is as a convenient limit case of a more general model with imperfect
monitoring.
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productivity in the second period, i.e., wE2 = π0 and wD2 = πH .6 For separation to
occur in the first period, we have two IC conditions. The lifetime utility of a low type
must be maximized from choosing E, i.e., wE1 + wE2 ≥ wD1 + wD2 , and the lifetime utility
for the high type must be maximized from choosing D, i.e., wD1 + wD2 ≥ wE1 + wE2 .
Using the second period wages, we therefore have that wE1 − wD1 = πH − π0 for both IC
conditions to hold. A firm must make zero profits in expectation in the first period, i.e.,
(πH −wD1 ) + (π0 −wE1 ) = 0. The only first period wages consistent with self-sorting and
zero profits are therefore wD1 = π0 and wE1 = πH . We have then derived wages assuming
existence. We now prove existence of a separating equilibrium.
The IC conditions in the previous paragraph ensure that the agent does not have
incentives to deviate from the conjectured equilibrium. The firms do not have incentives
to renegotiate the oﬀer in the interim, since this could only make harm (the agent self-
sorting into the wrong activity) given their interim beliefs. It is also easy to see that
second-period firms would not have incentives to deviate given their posterior beliefs.
We now check under which circumstances a firm would wish to deviate from {wE1 ,
wD1 , d = 1}, and specify oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs. That a firm deviating by oﬀering
d < 1 cannot be profitable is shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Here we consider a
firm deviating in wage oﬀers. First note that a firm would never raise wD1 or wE1 because
it would then attract both types, pay more for them and have them in less productive
activities. (The firm earns zero profits in the conjectured equilibrium. Raising wE1 will
simply pay more for both types of workers going into task E and generating on average
π0 rather than (π0 + πH)/2. Raising wD1 will pay more for both types of workers going
into task D and generating (πL+πH)/2 rather than (π0+πH)/2.) Also, a firm would not
lower both wD1 and wE1 as it would then not attract any type.
Let us now suppose a firm deviates by lowering just wD1 or wE1 . Since we are using
sequential equilibria, we need examine what happens when firm believes it will attract
both types of workers with positive probability (though not necessarily in equal propor-
tion). We first consider a deviation {wE1 ,w’D1 }, where w’D1 < wD1 . A high type accepting
this oﬀer would then work in E if w’D1 is not adjusted upwards in the interim. The firm
6The non-negativity of wages is enough to ensure this outcome. See Kaplan & Wettstein (2000) for
details.
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would revise w’D1 upwards in the interim if this could make the high type “switch” to D
in a profitable way (without aﬀecting the low type). Denote the revised oﬀer for w”D1 .
The extra compensation required to make the high type pick D rather than E would be
the agent’s loss of career gains from choosing D, i.e., wE2 − wD2 = π0 − πH . Since this
expression is negative, the firm can pay the agent a lower wage in the D activity than in
the E activity and still make him switch. The cheapest way to make this occur will be to
set w”D1 = π0−πH+wE1 . But this means that w”D1 = π0 = wD1 > w’D1 . In other words, by
revising its wage oﬀer in the interim, the firm can both reduce the wage bill and improve
productivity. Hence w’D1 cannot be a time-consistent deviation.
Let us now consider a firm deviating by oﬀering {w’E1 ,wD1 }, where w’E1 < wE1 . Suppose
again that the firm believes that after a deviation it will attract both types with a positive
probability. A low type accepting this oﬀer would then work in D if w’E1 is not adjusted
upwards. The firm would revise w’E1 upwards in the interim if this could make L “switch”
to D in a profitable way (without aﬀecting the high type). Denote the revised oﬀer for
w”E1 . The extra compensation required to make the low type pick E rather than D would
be the agent’s loss of career gains from choosing D, i.e., wD2 −wE2 = πH−π0. The cheapest
way to make the agent willing two switch would be to set w”E1 − wD1 = πH − π0 (which
implies that w”E1 = wE1 ). Hence, a firm would prefer to raise the wage for E if the extra
wage compensation is less than the productivity improvement,
πH − π0 < π0 − πL. (1)
If (1) holds, then deviating by oﬀering w’E1 would not be time consistent and a separating
equilibrium exists. On the other hand, if (1) does not hold, a firm can profit by deviating
through (credible) cream-skimming, and a separating equilibrium cannot exist.
Now uniqueness. Suppose first that there exists an alternative separating equilibrium.
For self-sorting to occur in the first period, it is necessary that (wE1 = πH−k, wD1 = π0−k)
for the agent’s IC conditions to hold (the separating equilibrium above corresponds to
k = 0). Suppose there exists a separating equilibrium with k > 0. But in that case there
would exist  such that a firm could deviate by oﬀering wE1 = πH −k+ , wD1 = π0−k+ 
and attract the agent with probability 1 (instead of with probability 1/2) and make a
gain. Hence there is a unique separating equilibrium. To see that there cannot exist an
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assignment equilibrium is relegated to the proof of Proposition 2.
In a separating equilibrium a firm sets d = 1, hence the agent is hired and then fully
delegated the job design. A high type gets a pay less than marginal productivity in the
first period but sends a good signal about his abilities, that has monetary value through
a higher pay in the second period. For low type, the equilibrium outcome is the reverse.
To be willing to reveal low ability by choosing the easy activity rather than herding in
with the high type, a low type must be compensated by a high wage in the first period,
due to the inferior career prospects from doing so.7 The information rent earned by the
low type creates a potential incentive for firms to deviate in order to attract only the high
type, by holding the oﬀer wD1 fixed and reducing wE1 . However, when it is suﬃciently
inexpensive for firms to make the low type choose the easy activity instead of the diﬃcult
activity in the interim, by raising the oﬀer wE1 at that point, such cream-skimming is not
time consistent (credible), and a separating equilibrium exists.
The proposition illustrates how delegation can boost productivity through improved
allocation of human resources. If a firm instead of delegating assigned to the E activity or
to the D activity without consulting the agent, it would obtain an expected production
of max{θπH + (1− θ)πL, π0}. On the other hand, the expected production in separating
equilibria equals θπH + (1 − θ)π0. The extra production (and, by zero profits, wages)
in separating equilibria reaches its maximum for an intermediate value of θ = (π0 −
πL)/(πH − πL).8
To see that the existence of a separating equilibrium is linked to career concerns, we
measure the strength of career concerns as the wage diﬀerential wD2 −wE2 . When wD2 −wE2
is low, it is cheap to revise the oﬀer wE1 upwards in the interim, to make the low type
choose the easy rather than the diﬃcult activity. Therefore, a separating equilibrium
is more likely to exist the weaker career concerns. We can further link the strength of
the career concerns to the technology of the firm. A natural measure of the returns to
7In the Appendix we show that with optimal performance contracts the low type does not necessarily
make a higher wage than the high type in the first period.
8We see this since for large θ, we have θπH + (1 − θ)πL > π0. The extra production is then (1 −
θ)(π0 − πL), which is higher the smaller the θ. For small θ, we have θπH + (1 − θ)πL < π0. The extra
production is then θ(πH −π0), which is higher the larger the θ. Thus, the extra production is maximized
for θ such that θπH + (1− θ)πL = π0.
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ability is πH − π0. This is the diﬀerence in productivity between the low type and the
high type under an eﬃcient allocation. On the other hand, π0 − πL measures the cost of
misallocating a low type to the diﬃcult activity. We coin this “Peter’s cost”. Therefore,
a separating equilibrium is less likely to exist the higher returns to ability and the lower
Peter’s cost. We can note that an increase in the returns to the exploitation activity,
π0, both decreases the returns to ability and increases the Peter’s cost, so that such an
increase unambiguously increases the degree of delegation. This will be used later.
The full delegation in a separating equilibrium diﬀers radically in spirit from the
assignment and job design literatures, where firms direct agents to do specific activities
rather than delegating the choice. Since wD2 −wE2 > 0 in a separating equilibrium, we can
interpret this as the diﬃcult activity endogenously becoming the “prestige” activity. In
contrast to Aghion & Tirole (1997) the benefit a agent enjoys from delegation is therefore
endogenous, in that it depends on the equilibrium sorting into a prestigious and non-
prestigious activity.
3.2 Assignment equilibria
We now examine a firm’s delegation policy when the condition in Proposition 1 does not
hold.
Proposition 2 If πH−π0 > π0−πL, then the unique time-consistent SE is an assignment
equilibrium where
(i) The agent is assigned to the diﬃcult activity with probability 1− d.
(ii) Delegation d decreases in the returns to talent πH−π0 and increases in the Peter’s
cost π0 − πL.
Proof. We first derive wages assuming the existence of an equilibrium where the
worker is assigned to the D activity, then show the existence of such an equilibrium, and
finally prove uniqueness. Since the on- and oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs are analogous to
those in Proposition 1, we leave out the discussion of these. We start by determining the
wages {wD1 , wD2 , wE1 , wE2 } in an assignment equilibrium with a given d, and then determine
d. For convenience, we change variables so that the degree of assignment equals f (≡ 1−d).
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In that case, the probability of an agent being H conditional on activity becomes (recall
that assigned workers are in D and all H types given a choice will also choose D),
θD =
θ
θ + f(1− θ) (2)
θE = 0
Since the firms must earn zero profits in the second period and only the L type will be
engaged in E, we can determine the second period wages as,
wD2 = θ
DπH + (1− θD)π0 (3)
wE2 = π
0
By self-sorting in the first period, we must as in a separating equilibrium have that
wE1 − wD1 = wD2 − wE2 , where the right hand side is a function of f . Using equations (2)
and (3), we find that,
wD2 − wE2 =
θ
θ + f(1− θ)π
H +
f(1− θ)
θ + f(1− θ)π
0 − π0 (4)
=
θ
θ + f(1− θ)(π
H − π0)
{wD1 (f), wD2 (f), wE1 (f), wE2 (f)} is then determined from (3), (4), and first-period firms
making zero profits. We now claim that f∗ is determined by
(π0 − πL)− θ
θ + f(1− θ)(π
H − π0) = 0 (5)
Since the left hand side increases in f , this expression uniquely determines f∗.9 Note that
(ii) follows immediately from inspection. We now prove the claim in Steps 1-4.
Step 1. Suppose that both firms oﬀer {wD1 (f), wD2 (f), wE1 (f), wE2 (f), f} where f ∈
(0, 1). In the interim, there is a potential gain from decreasing f (increasing delegation),
since this improves allocation. Label the renegotiated f by f 0(< f). The gain from setting
f 0 = 0 (setting f 0 to an intermediate value is treated in the same manner) would be the
productivity improvement from making the low type switch, i.e., π0−πL. The cost would
9If there does not exist f∗ ∈ (0, 1) that solves (5) then the equilibrium must be pooling. In the
following we assume that there exists an interior f∗.
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be the extra compensation needed to make him switch, i.e., wD2 −wE2 . Using (4), the net
gain from setting f 0 = 0 in the interim, NG(f), equals
NG(f) ≡ (π0 − πL)− (wD2 − wE2 ) = (π0 − πL)−
θ
θ + f(1− θ)(π
H − π0) (6)
NG(f) increases in f and NG(f∗) = 0 by (5).
Step 2. Consider f > f∗. From (6), we would then haveNG(f) > 0. In words, f > f ∗
would not be a time-consistent deviation since the firm would benefit from allowing full
delegation in the interim.
Step 3. Suppose that the other firm sticks to {wD1 (f∗), wE1 (f∗), f∗}. Setting f < f ∗
would attract the low type with probability 1 and cannot be a profitable deviation.
Step 4. Since f < f ∗ would not be profitable and f > f∗ would not be time consistent,
f = f∗ is the only candidate equilibrium value of f∗.
Having shown that f∗ is the only candidate equilibrium value for f , we need to show
that profitable wage deviations are not possible (deviations that combines adjusting w
or f are treated in the same manner). Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, the
critical deviation is w’E1 < wE1 (f∗). But by the same argument as in Proposition 1, such
a deviation can only be time consistent if the gain from moving a low type in the interim
exceeds the extra compensation needed. This will be the case if NG(f) > 0, but this
cannot hold by the definition of f∗.
We now prove that there cannot be assignment equilibrium where the number of
slots in activity D is restricted. If the number of slots in D is restricted, there are two
possibilities. First, it can be the case that both types prefer D. In that case, the proportion
of types should be the same in both activities. If this happens, there are no career concerns
since no information inferred by activity choice. Because of this, the firm can induce the
high type to switch from E to D, by paying the same wage in D as in E. Such a scheme
would increase productivity without increasing costs. So in equilibrium, it cannot be the
case that both types wish to engage in D. The second possibility is that the low type
wishes to engage in E, while the high type wishes to engage in D. In that case, total
wages must be equalized across activities. But then, the firm can increase profits by
increasing delegation, and allow the agent to engage in D rather than E (since only the
high type would wish to move). This occurs since both the wage in D is lower than in E
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(the probability of H is higher in D than in E) and the productivity of the high type is
higher in D. Hence a situation where the slots in D are rationed cannot be an equilibrium.
To prove uniqueness, first observe that by Proposition 1 there cannot exist a separating
equilibrium, since πH−π0 > π0−πL. To see that there cannot exist other equilibria where
the worker is assigned to E, suppose that there exists such an assignment equilibrium
with f < f∗. But in that case a firm could profitably deviate by increasing f (it would
attract only the high type, since a low type prefers a low f). This deviation would be
time consistent since f < f∗. On the other hand suppose that there exists an assignment
equilibrium with f > f ∗. Then both firms would have incentives to lower f in the interim,
and hence this deviation would not be time consistent.
In assignment equilibria the firm is forced to act as a traditional principal, restricting
the activities possible for the agent, and a centralized solution to the job design problem
emerges endogenously.10 The economic intuition for an assignment equilibrium is quite
simple. The principal uses the degree of delegated job design as a tool in recruiting able
agents. By restricting the agent to do the diﬃcult activity (with a high probability) the
firm avoids being stuck with low talent. We can most clearly see this point by assuming
that one of the firms deviates by oﬀering the same wages but oﬀer a higher degree of
delegation. The high type would not be aﬀected by such a deviation, while the low
type would realize that he would get the preferred activity (E) with a higher probability.
Therefore, the low type would attend the deviating firm with probability 1, resulting in
negative profits for the deviator. On the other hand, oﬀering a lower degree of delegation
would not be a credible deviation, as the firm would have incentives to increase the degree
of delegation in the interim. Hence we obtain a theory that not only explains why agents
are given limited delegation, but also why firms would opt for “bold” projects in order to
attract talent.
Note that if firms do not assign workers - and set equal wages for the two activities,
the low type would imitate the high type and herd into the more prestigious activity,
resulting in an eﬃciency loss. This argument highlights the role of firms in our model;
firms do not exist for traditional reasons such that better ability to bear risk or because of
10Note also that an alternative interpretation of rationing equilibria is that of job rotation; all interested
workers are allowed to do the easy task, but only a certain amount of time.
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the need to coordinate diﬀerent lines of production, but to adjust wages (and the degree
of delegation) to ensure a second-best allocation of workers.
4 Discussion
The simple yet powerful insight that we obtain is when career concerns are weak, a worker’s
private benefit to misrepresentation is small and firms opt for a liberal delegation practice,
and when the career concerns are strong, this private benefit is large and firms opt for
the traditional emphasis on centralized, top-down job design. We note that this contrasts
with Fama (1982) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), which emphasize the beneficial incentive
eﬀects of career concerns on reducing agency costs. In the present setting, career concerns
increases agency costs and necessitates limits to delegation. In this section, we consider
some applications and then discuss the robustness of our theoretical results.
While the early literature on decentralization of authority to workers and new work
practices tended to focus on documenting a variety of facets of the phenomenon, more
recently the empirical literature has attempted to link degree of delegation to wage levels
(Caroli & Van Reenen 2001, Black et al, 2003, Bauer & Brender, 2003). A robust finding
from this strand of the literature is a positive relation between degree of delegation and
wage levels, controlling for a variety of worker and firm characteristics. While established
theories of organizational delegation, such as Aghion & Tirole (1997), does not predict a
positive relationship between delegation and wages, one does emerge in our paper for the
simple reason that increased delegation will be associated with a more eﬃcient allocation
of talent inside the firm, leading to higher wages.11 ,12
11In the present model, firms make zero profits so that the agent gets all the surplus created. Obviously,
there is a wide range of other sharing rules that share this positive relationship between delegation and
wages.
12In Aghion & Tirole (1997), agents get (exogenous) private benefits from delegation, which drives the
relationship. Other papers along these lines include Baker et al., (1999), and Zabojnik (2002). There
is a largely independent literature on delegation that considers other motives than private information,
such as reducing managerial overload (Aoki 1986), costly writing of contracts (Marschak & Reichelstein,
1998), and delegation as a commitment device (Fershtman and Judd, 1986). Other papers with private
information as an ingredient in the delegation choice includes Laﬀont & Martimort (1998) on the costs
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The last decades have seen some major changes in employment relations, such as the
increased use of IT, increased wage inequality, and increased delegation and decentral-
ization of decision-making in firms (see the survey by Bresnahan et al., 2002).13 With
firm-level data, Caroli & Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) find that in-
creased use of IT and increased delegation has arrived in a cluster, suggesting a causal link
between cheaper IT and increased delegation. Suppose that stronger and easier to handle
computers increases the productivity (of a given worker) in exploitation activities (such as
quality testing and updating, information collection and simple analysis connected with
e.g., sales), but has less of a productivity augmenting eﬀect in exploration activities asso-
ciated with conceptualization and the exploration of new paths (as way of analogue, the
cheaper use of computers probably had a much stronger productivity augmenting eﬀect
on research in applied mathematics such as branches of physics and engineering, than in
pure mathematics such as algebraic topology). Interpreted in terms of the model, the
increased use of IT increases π0, decreases the returns to ability and the degree of career
concerns, and therefore should lead to increased delegation.14
Another application of the model is to understand cross-sectional diﬀerences in degree
of communication and collusion between agents, and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2002) on the equivalence
between centralization and delegation in a Laﬀont-Martimort type of setting. These papers explore the
conditions under which the revelation principle implies that centralization and delegation are equivalent.
13Bresnahan et al. (2002) argues that the trend towards more IT and more delegation have been
associated with a third trend, towards more wage inequality. This trend can also be accommodated by
the framework if we introduce "unskilled" workers into the framework.
14Consider two candidate explanations. One reasonable eﬀect of cheaper IT technology is to lower the
cost of communication between diﬀerent layers of the organization, e.g., through the use of E-mail. But
from arguments as in e.g., Dessein (2001), such a decreased cost of communication should lead to less
delegation, not more, since a decreased cost of communication makes centralization of decision-making
authority cheaper. Another candidate explanation is the following. Suppose that increased use of IT
makes tasks more complex (Bresnahan et al., 2002). A reasonable consequence of such added complexity
is that performance evaluation becomes harder. But as shown in the appendix, and in a related setting by
Prendergast (2002), worse information about performance should lead to less delegation, not more. There
are other alternative explanations. For example, a transition from mainframes to personal computers
implies a lesser need for coordination at the managerial level. Or, the increased use of IT has lead both
to more complex tasks and improved performance evaluation, for example through supervisors increased
use of IT.
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of delegation. For example, by any reasonable measure of degree of delegation, typical
bureaucracies, public or private, delegate less than hi-tech firms.15 While some of the
diﬀerences in delegation level might be traced back to diﬀerences in firm size (a greater
need for coordination in large firms and hence less delegation), some large companies
such as Microsoft (Herbold, 2002) still have a high degree of delegation. Our argument
goes as follows. In bureaucracies, there are well-defined ladders for job titles and salaries.
An agents’ placement on these ladders is visible to the outside market. In contrast,
in hi-tech firms job titles and salaries are more opaque. As an illustrating example, in
Sun Hydraulics job titles did simply not exist and the pay policy is extremely covert
(Baron & Kreps, 1999). This implies that employees with the same degree of delegation
in bureaucracies have stronger career concerns than employees in hi-tech firms because of
this increased visibility of the choices they make. Employees in bureaucracies therefore
should be delegated less than their counterparts in hi-tech firms, a prediction that is
consistent with the available evidence.
One of the potential extensions of the model is extending the contract duration. We
can model this by assuming that first-period productivities equal απ and second period
productivities equal (1−α)π, where α ∈ (0, 1) and α is a measure of contract duration; α
close to 1 would correspond to long-term contracts (the analysis of the previous sections
corresponds to the case α = 1/2). In a separating equilibrium, the second period wages
equal wE2 = (1 − α)π0 and wD2 = (1 − α)πH . If a firm attempts to cream-skim in the
first period, then in the interim it will get a productivity gain of α(π0 − πL) from raising
the wage for the easy activity, while the necessary compensation equals (1−α)(πH −π0).
A separating equilibrium therefore exists if the first eﬀect dominates the second, or if
α(π0 − πL) > (1 − α)(πH − π0). Clearly this equation is more likely to hold the higher
α. The interpretation is straightforward; a higher α makes career concerns less of an
issue, and more delegation can be sustained in equilibrium. This insight can be applied to
understand diﬀerences between labor markets in the US and Japan. As described in an
extensive literature surveyed by Aoki (1986), Japanese firms, compared to the US, have
the job security of long-term employment relationships and delegate significantly more to
15This is based on evidence from case studies of firms such as Dell, Gore-Tex, Hewlett-Packard, Mi-
crosoft, and Sun Hydraulics.
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their workers than American firms.16 For other evidence supporting the same idea, Rajan
& Wulf (2003) consider pay and organizational structure in 300 large US companies, and
find that companies with more long-term compensation (stocks, options) delegate more
to lower level managers.17
Robustness. To assess the robustness of our theoretical results, let us briefly discuss
the role of the most important modeling assumptions. First, what would happen if the
agent learns about his activity match only after starting with a firm, but before choosing
activity? In that case, there would be no adverse selection at the hiring stage, and a
higher degree of delegation would be sustainable in equilibrium. Second, one could argue
that there are other private benefits than career prospects that may contribute to an
employee desiring prestige activities, such as sense of importance or recognition by peers
and friends. Such eﬀects will work in a similar manner to career concerns, and tend to
limit the degree of delegation. Third, suppose that we allow for eﬀort costs that are
observable and contractible. If the easy activity has a lower (first best) eﬀort cost than
the diﬃcult activity, the eﬀective (net) π0 would increase relative to the eﬀective πH and
πL. A higher degree of delegation would occur. If the cost of eﬀort diﬀer for the two
types, this creates the possibility of the firm screening the two types, which would work
in the same qualitative manner as performance contracts.
16Our model can be extended to explain this diﬀerence of contract length between countries (or indus-
tries) by formalizing the ideal contract length as a trade-oﬀ between benefits from increased delegation
and costs from being stuck with undesirable matches.
17We can also consider the eﬀect of human capital acquisition between the periods, reflecting the idea
that the agent becomes more productive with time. Suppose that second period productivities equal hπ,
where h > 1. This will have exactly the same eﬀect on delegation as increasing the length of the second
period, i.e., delegation will decrease. Therefore, first period wages will decrease due to inferior allocation
inside the firm, while second period wages will increase due to improved productivity in that period.
Empirical work has shown that worker (nominal) wages typically increase over time (see Gibbons &
Waldman, 1999b). Adding human capital acquisition is one of the possibilities to ensure that separating
equilibria have this property (performance contracts is another, as shown in the Appendix).
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5 Conclusion
We have developed a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately
informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or exploration activities.
The theory is based on two simple components, private information and career concerns.
In the model constructed, these components were shown to, depending on technological
and other economic factors, produce equilibria with a varying degree of worker delegation.
The stronger career concerns, the less delegation. The less delegation, the less eﬃcient
allocation of talent inside the firm, and the lower wages. This basic finding is consistent
with evidence and not easily explainable by existing theories. In addition, the theory
seems consistent with evidence on the relation between contract length and delegation.
While we have considered several ways to vary the degree of career concerns, we have
not considered varying degrees of private information. In the corporate finance literature,
a low liquidity of a stock is commonly seen as an indicator of a high level of information
asymmetry between diﬀerent traders. Analogously, we might interpret a low turnover in
an industry as an indication of a high level of asymmetric information (obviously other
factors such as the degree of firm-specific human capital would also play a role). We
would therefore predict that the higher turnover rates, the lower degree of delegation.
This conjecture seems to have empirical support from Aoki (1986) and Black & Lynch
(2000) and deserves to be investigated further.
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7 Appendix: optimal performance contracts
Here we solve the more general model where the agent’s type can depend upon perfor-
mance measures.
There are two possible output levels in the D activity, πlow and πhigh, where a low
(high) type has probability PL (PH) of obtaining πhigh. The expected output for the low
(high) type equals πL (πH), and therefore PL < PH . Output in the E activity is as before
independent of ability, and with mean π0. We denote the performance of the agent in the
first period by π.
Firms now oﬀer (and renegotiate) performance dependent contracts {wD1 (π), wE1 (π), d}.
Timing is as before with the addition that performance is becomes public knowledge af-
ter the first period. 18 For simplicity, we assume that output is not contractible in the
18Since workers reveal their type in a separating equilibrium, the conditions for existence of such an
equilibrium do not depend upon performance being observable to the outside firm or not. The rationing
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second period (this will have no qualitative bearing on our results). As before, we focus
on time-consistent SE.
Since performance in E is independent of ability, an agent that chooses E will therefore
be oﬀered a fixed salary denoted by F , i.e., wE1 (π) = F . If the agent is engaged in D,
he gets a wage contingent on whether the output is πlow or πhigh, denoted by BL and
BH respectively. To avoid trivial forcing contracts, we assume that the agent has limited
liability, so that F , BL, BH must be non-negative.
We assume that the low type breaks ties by choosing the E activity in the first period.
If the agent had a diﬀerent tie-breaking, we would get identical results but firms would
maximize profits by oﬀering sup(0, F ) instead of F to the low type in the first period to
ensure self-sorting. Our tie-breaking rule avoids such non-essential technicalities.
7.1 Separating equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, agent type is revealed to both firms before the second period
and the second period wage must be πH for the high type π0 for the low type. To induce
self-sorting as cheap as possible, optimal contracts must haveBL = 0, and we can therefore
write BH simply as B. Denoting the lifetime utility for a type i agent choosing activity
j in the first period for U ji , we then have,
UDH = PHB + π
H (7)
The first term PHB is the expected wage in the first period, and the second term πH is the
wage in the second period, if the agent chooses the D activity (remember in a separating
equilibrium only the high type chooses this activity). On the other hand, the utility for
the low type for choosing the E activity equals,
UEL = F + π
0 (8)
Where F is the fixed wage in the first period and π0 is what he gets in the second period.
We have two IC conditions for a separating equilibrium,
PHB + πH ≥ F + π0 (IC1)
F + π0 ≥ PLB + πH (IC2)
equilibrium would also have the same qualitative features but slightly diﬀerent wages.
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(IC1) is the self-sorting constraint for the high type, and (IC2) is the self-sorting constraint
for the low type.19
If F > π0, then (IC2) binds.20 In that case, we can determine F as,
F = PLB + πH − π0 (9)
This implies (by PL < PH and IC2) that the high type strictly prefers the D activity in a
separating equilibrium, thus (IC1) holds as well. The first-period zero profit condition is,
θπH + (1− θ)π0 = θBPH + (1− θ)F (10)
The left hand side is the expected productivity of the firm, and the right hand side is
the total wage bill. (IC2) and the zero profit conditions then determine the equilibrium
values of F and B, denoted by F ∗ and B∗, as
B∗ =
π0 − (1− 2θ)(πH − π0)
θ(PH − PL) + PL
(11)
F ∗ =
θ(PH + PL)(πH − π0) + PLπ0
θ(PH − PL) + PL
We can note that the solution for the simplified model in Section 3 is obtained by setting
PL = PH = P and θ = 1/2, in which case F = πH and PB = π0.
To have the same type of separating equilibrium as before, where the low type is paid
above marginal productivity to self-sort, we need that F ∗ > π0.21 From (11), this occurs
whenever PLπH/PH+ πH − π0 > π0. However, with the opposite inequality, PLπH/PH+
πH − π0 < π0, we get F ∗ < π0 from (9), which clearly cannot occur in (separating)
equilibrium, since a firm would make a profit no matter who shows up in the E activity.
In that case, there exists a separating equilibrium with F ∗ = π0 and B∗ = πH/PH , that
19There is a πH on RHS of (IC2), since the wage in the second period cannot be contingent on second-
period output and should not be contingent upon first-period output since both firms believe the worker
in the D task is high even if his performance is low. Again, assuming second period output is contractible
does not qualitatively change results.
20If not, a firm can oﬀer a contract with a lower F and obtain only the high ability workers. This firm
would not have incentive to later raise the low ability worker’s wage since such worker would already
have incentive to self-sort.
21The liability constraint, B∗ ≥ 0, is satisfied whenever θ > 12 − π0/(πH − π0). Hence a low θ is an
additional reason to get rationing, but here we assume that θ is suﬃciently high.
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is both types get (expected) wage equal to marginal productivity in both periods, which
is a qualitatively diﬀerent separating equilibrium from that obtained previously.22 To
examine additional conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium where the low
type is paid a premium to self-sort, that is when F ∗ > π0, we now consider the possibility
of cream-skimming.
Suppose one of the firms deviates by oﬀering a low wage for the easy activity (in an
attempt to cream-skim). This firm will have incentives to renegotiate this oﬀer after the
agent has chosen which firm to work for, by raising the wage for E such that wE1 = F , if
the production gain exceeds the wage compensation loss. The extra compensation needed
to induce the low type to switch contracts equals πH−π0, that is the wage loss in period 2
from being revealed as having being the low type. It will pay to make this compensation
only if the productivity improvement exceeds the extra compensation, that is
πH − π0 < π0 − πL (12)
When this no cream-skimming condition holds, a separating equilibrium exists, which is
analogous to the case without performance contracts (equation 1). By combining the no
cream-skimming condition and the condition PLπH + PH(πH − 2π0) > 0, we see that a
separating equilibrium of the type considered in the main text, where the low type is
compensated to self-sort, exists whenever (12) holds and
πH
PH
>
πL
PL
. Since this condition
always holds for PL = PH , the essential requirement for this type of separating equilibrium
is that the diﬀerence PH − PL is not too great, or in other words that the monitoring
technology is not too precise, which is an intuitively appealing result. Let us summarize.
Proposition 3 When the no cream-skimming condition (12) holds and the monitoring
technology is not too precise, a separating equilibrium exists where the low type is paid
above marginal productivity in the first period. When monitoring is precise, a separating
equilibrium exists where both types are paid their marginal productivity. In both types of
separating equilibria, the agent is fully delegated the job design decision, and a high type
strictly prefers the diﬃcult activity.
22This solution will satisfy (IC2) if 2π0 ≥ PL
πH
PH
+ πH , which is the same condition that determines
when our candidate F ∗ is less than π0. Thus, we can get a separating equilibrium for this case.
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Let us now see what happens if a separating equilibrium does not exist due to the
cream-skimming threat.
7.2 Assignment equilibria
In an assignment equilibrium, an agent that is engaged in E in the first period will be low
type with probability 1, and will therefore get the wage π0 in the second period. For an
agent that chooses D, the wage in the second period will depend on the fraction of high
types in D and on whether the agent obtained a bonus or not. Recall the assumption that
pay can only be conditioned on performance in the first period, and hence that the agent
simply gets his expected productivity in the second period.
Let θH (θL) be the probability that an agent with high (low) performance is the high
type, and as before, let f be the probability that the low type is assigned to D, while a
fraction 1− f (= d) are allowed to choose freely, and hence choose E. Then,
θH =
θPH
θPH + (1− θ)fPL
(13)
θL =
θ(1− PH)
θ(1− PH) + (1− θ)f(1− PL)
Furthermore, let wH2 (wL2 ) be the second period wage for an agent with a high (low)
performance in the first period. Then,
wH2 = θHπ
H + (1− θH)π0 (14)
wL2 = θLπ
H + (1− θL)π0
wH2 > wL2 since the high type has a better chance of getting a bonus than the low type.
We now have the IC conditions for an assignment equilibrium,
PH(B + wH2 ) + (1− PH)wL2 ≥ F + π0 (IC3)
F + π0 ≥ PL(B + wH2 ) + (1− PL)wL2 (IC4)
(IC3) is the self-sorting constraint for the high type in an assignment equilibrium, and
(IC4) the self-sorting constraint for the low type. As with a separating equilibrium, if
F > π0 and (IC4) were not binding, a firm can improve profits by lowering F and getting
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the low type with a smaller probability. Hence we can determine F as,
F = PL(B + wH2 ) + (1− PL)wL2 − π0 (15)
Since (IC4) binds, (IC3) becomes redundant (by PL < PH and wL2 < wH2 ), and the high
type must strictly prefer D also in a assignment equilibrium. The first period zero profit
condition is,
θπH + (1− θ)(1− f)π0 + (1− θ)fπL = θBPH + (1− θ)(1− f)F + (1− θ)fBPL. (16)
The left hand side is the expected productivity of the firm, and the right hand side is
the total wage bill. The first term on the left hand side is the productivity of the high
type, the second term is the productivity of the low type in E, and the third term is the
productivity of the low type in D. The right hand side gives the corresponding wages
for those three groups of agents. The third equilibrium condition is that firms should
be indiﬀerent between shifting the low type (i.e., decreasing f) on the margin, i.e., that
π0−πL = F−PLB. Again, the productivity improvement from shifting the low type is on
the left hand side, and the required extra compensation on the right hand side. We now
have five endogenous variables, F , B, f , wL2 , and wH2 , and five equations, the no-shifting
equation, zero profits, (IC2), and the equations determining wL2 , and wH2 . This system
has a unique solution equal to,
B∗ =
θ(πH − πL) + πL
θ(PH − PL) + PL
(17)
F ∗ = π0 +
θ(PLπH − PHπL)
θ(PH − PL) + PL
f∗ =
θPH(PL(πH − π0) + πL − π0)
PL(1− θ)(PL(πH − π0) + 2π0 − πH − πL)
The degree of assignment f∗ can be seen to decrease in π0 and increase in πH and in
πL. Moreover, f∗ increases in θ and in PH , and is ambiguous to changes in PL. A
self-sorting premium is paid to the low type (F ∗ > π0) whenever
πH
PH
>
πL
PL
, which
is the same condition on monitoring as described above.23 To see that there cannot be
assignment in the case of perfect monitoring technology, that is when PL = 0 and PH = 1,
23If (2π0 − πH)/πH ≤ PL/PH ≤ πL/πH , the (IC4) constraint may not be binding and as before we
must have F ∗ = π0.
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observe that the denominator of f∗ goes to 0 when PL approaches zero. By solving for
f∗ = 0, we get that assignment occurs whenever PL >
π0 − πL
πH − π0 , from which it follows
that πH − π0 > π0 − πL must hold to get assignment, as shown before. We can then
summarize.
Proposition 4 If a separating equilibrium does not exist, there exists an assignment equi-
librium where the agent is assigned to the D activity with probability f. In such an equilib-
rium, the low type is paid a premium to be willing to self-sort, and the high type strictly
prefers the D activity to the E activity. Moreover, the degree of assignment decreases in
π0 and increases in πH and in πL.
The introduction of contractible measures of individual performance thus strengthens
the qualitative insights of the paper in the following sense: With optimal performance
contracts, we can still get assignment, a low type agent is paid a premium to be willing
to self-sort, and moreover a high type agent strictly prefers the D activity to the E
activity, provided that the monitoring technology is not too precise. In other words our
line of argument is not dependent on the double indiﬀerence condition in the previous
sections, nor on individual performance not being contractible. More generally, if other
screening mechanisms are available, but are imperfect due to for example measurement
costs, then job design gives information about ability, and we get the interaction of private
information and career concern eﬀects that has been our focus.
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